The ultimate goal of Hegel's history is true, subjective freedom of man as an individual and as a universal being. Hegel divides history into several distinct stages (namely, the Oriental, the Persian, the Greek, the Roman, the German, and the Modern). Each of these civilizations is defined by its relationship to Spirit; from the Oriental to the Modern stage, this relationship with Spirit has expanded and become more subjective. Each civilization undergoes a dialectical clash with the next; for example, the Romans took the unrestrained individual subjectivity of the Greeks and subjugated it to the political objective Universality of the Roman state. The result of this dialectical opposition was a new relationship with Spirit that was more complex than it had previously been, but had not yet reached the ultimate peak of complete subjective individuality. Not until the German world, with the Catholic Church bringing individuals back to a contemplation of the subjective relation to Spirit while also promoting the objective Universal through its ecclesiastical structure, did true freedom become a possibility.

The study of history itself becomes an integral part of this progression towards ultimate freedom. By studying history, individuals and mankind in general become acquainted with the events, both tragic and wonderful, which are a part of God's plan. Daniel Berthold-Bond states this concept rather nicely: "History exhibits the relation of consciousness to the world, and this developing relation constitutes our knowledge, our appropriation of truth" (Berthold-Bond, 14). If this "plan of Providence" (history) is studied properly, one can understand the mind of God. Thus, as history progresses, mankind becomes ever more familiar with the true essence of the world. As such, history can be defined as the "unfolding of the mind of God;" for through the dialectical clash of civilizations, the providential plan of history becomes more clear, and individuals gained a more complete concept of themselves and each other (the Spirit and the Universal).

SIZE=+2>The question thus presented is, "How exactly does one study history in order to achieve true freedom?" It seems easy to state that by properly studying history, we can come to a complete understanding of our selves and our relations to the world. The most important and interesting aspect of Hegel's history is that he provides a definite set of instructions for the proper study of the universal.

Hegel's Philosophy of History begins with a chapter devoted to the improper methods which historians are fond of using. First, there is the "Original History" of historians like Thucydides and Heroditus; their history is simply a bare reporting of facts without any historical perspective. Because the "original historians" were writing about their own times, they are both products as well as recorders of their time: "The influences that have formed the writer are identical with those which have moulded the events that constitute the matter of his story. The author's spirit, and that of the actions he narrates, is one and the same" (Hegel 2). This style of history is of little value, for not only is it narrow and prejudiced, but it offers no concept of the ultimate goal of history.

Next, there are several types of "Reflective History." Each of these types is a step beyond "Original History" in that its authors attempt to provide a certain sense of cohesion and purpose to history. The first of these types is "Universal" history. The "Universal" historian "attempts to gain a view of the entire history of a people" (Hegel 5). However, the "Universal" historian too often approaches this task with his own pre-conceived notions of what the entire history of a people is. This type of history is also prone to boiled-down, abstract generalities such as, "This year war was carried on with the Volsci" (Hegel, 5). The fact that war was "carried on" is treated as an abstract principle, yet no examination is made of the story behind the event itself. "A history which aspires to traverse long periods of time, or to be universal, must indeed forego the attempt to give individual representations of the past as it actually existed" (Hegel 5).

The second type of "Reflective History" is the "Pragmatic." A "Pragmatic" historian holds an exclusively utilitarian view of history; any study of history must be attached to some sort of moral or political education. For instance, one might study the plight of African slaves in order to learn that slavery is wrong. However, as Hegel sensibly declares: "But what experience and history teach is this--that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted upon principles deduced from it. Each period is involved in such peculiar circumstances...that its conduct must be regulated by considerations connected with itself, and itself alone" (Hegel 6). Statements such as these make it clear why Hegel's thought is often seen as the starting point for relativism; nonetheless, it is an important concept to grasp. Far too often, historians, politicians, and moralists defend the study of history with the "history-repeats-itself" thesis. These sophists claim that by understanding the mistakes of our past, we can correct our future behavior. But as Hegel correctly points out, the study of the past does not provide us with the answers to the future nor the present; the eras are too completely different in their circumstances.

The "Critical" historian spends his time examining historical narrations to determine their plausibility. While these historians may provide a valuable service to other historians by clarifying misleading contradictions in facts, their criticisms often lead to "subjective fancies in place of historical data" (Hegel 7). These historians are attempting to discover the truth of a situation in which they had no part; in fact, they often end up transferring their own circumstances and beliefs into their interpretations of the past, and rather than clarify misleading contradictions, they in fact cloud the issues still further.

Finally there are those "Reflective Historians" who take abstract views and attempt to place the occurrences of the past in a general framework without overreaching themselves to the extent of the "Universal" historians. For example, these historians might examine the History of Art or Science. By narrowing their examination, they are in effect able to expand the scope of their treatment, and thus, they can examine the generalities, the processes, the abstract complexities that have shaped the particular history that they are interested in. These historians are a bridge towards Hegel's ideal historian, the "Philosophical Historian," but they are distinguished from these latter by their inability to comprehend the guiding forces of the Spirit in the unfolding of "Providence's plan." (Hegel 8).

The true historian, according to Hegel, realizes that "Reason is sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process" (Hegel 9). Historical events are simply particular occurrences in what is essentially a rational plan. By comprehending history, one can thereby understand this grand plan of Providence.

Hegel does not expect historians to be objective; in fact, they must bring their expectations and beliefs about the telos of history to their studies in order to impose a sense of order and cogency in history's seeming irrationality. "Even the ordinary, the 'impartial' historiographer, who believes and professes that he maintains a simply receptive attitude; surrendering himself only to the data supplied him--is by no means passive as regards the exercise of his thinking powers" (Hegel 11). Indeed, the historian's mind is essential for interpreting history and the meaning of history.

However, historians cannot be guided by faith alone; though the aim of studying history is to understand God, one cannot attempt to study history by assuming that one knows God already. "Equally unsatisfactory is the merely abstract, undefined belief in a Providence, when that belief is not brought to bear upon the details of the process which it conducts" (Hegel 14). This concept was seized upon by later important historians such as David Strauss (Das Leben Jesu) who attempted to treat biblical or religious historical subjects in a more objective manner.

The greatest achievement of any historian is his or her ability to comprehend processes. All events, individuals, and institutions are a constantly evolving process. Nothing is eternal except change itself; thus, the ultimate challenge for any historian is the ability to comprehend the interconnectedness, both temporally and logically, between events, individuals, and institutions. All occurrences are a direct result of the clash between two opposing forces; by grasping this dialectic, historians can understand why events occur. Individuals play an important part in creating their own history, but as individuals, they are incapable of understanding their own role in the great "plan of Providence." Historical perspective allows us to understand the "larger" aspects of our existence. It's as if a cartographer, accustomed to making maps based on knowledge acquired from observing the ground at his feet, were suddenly taken up in an airplane; at a glance, he could comprehend the layout of the earth and the entire aim of his maps would become clear to him.

Thus, Hegel's history is all-encompassing. A history that is not deeply concerned with cultural, intellectual, religious, social, geographical, moral, and technological issues is an ineffective history. Nothing that contributes to the character of a people or nation can be ignored, for each of the above-mentioned concepts is an essential aspect of the "plan of Providence." One cannot truly comprehend the processes of history if one's observance of history is limited only to political events; even the greatest of kings could not escape responsibility to much larger forces, such as "the people," the nation's heritage, culture, and morality, and the geography of his kingdom. Even to understand simple political history, one must also understand the culture, geography, etc., of the nation (not the state; there is a distinct difference between the political state and the "ethnic" nation). Each nation, then, has its own salient characteristics that define it as a nation. Among the most important of the factors that help to decide a nation's character is its particular geography: "The spirit of a nation is determined by geographic and climatic particularities; it exists in time, and necessarily percurs the development of a particular principle, and therewith the development of a particular consciousness and reality,--it has an internal history" (Stallo, 518). Thus, we see that Hegel's history makes a much broader sweep across the events of human existence; in order to truly comprehend process and the Universal, history must be studied in such a way that all aspects of human existence are included.

A true comprehension of history is also a true understanding of the Universal, the Absolute. This true understanding can only be achieved by realizing that history is indeed a rational process. Once this is understood, the historian cannot be expected to be entirely objective; his own mental processes are essential to creating a comprehensive historical study. On the other hand, a historian cannot base his examination of history on pure faith alone; he must instead examine history in order to comprehend his faith (this is a crucial point for understanding David Strauss' Das Leben Jesu). A good historian must understand that history is a process, for this comprehension of process is essential to understanding the larger aspects of human existence beyond the realm of the individual. Finally, a historian must comprehend much more than just political history if he or she wants to truly understand the "plan of Providence." Since culture, morality, intellect, technology, etc., are all involved in creating the spirit of a nation, these concepts cannot be safely ignored by a historian.

Thus, Hegel's philosophy of history demands that historians aim their sights on lofty goals; the ability to recount the life of every European king is not sufficient knowledge. Rather than harbor a collection of specific facts, a good historian is most useful to himself and to his nation when he has a complete grasp of the processes of history. Once these processes are truly understood by every member of the nation, complete freedom will have been achieved. Thus, history is not only the "unfolding of the mind of God," but also a key to true subjective freedom for the individual. Few before Hegel had made such a bold statement.

There are problems with Hegel's philosophy, however. Possibly the most offensive to a modern reader is the apparent racism of Hegel's historical analysis. One of many examples of this racism / ethnocentrism can be found in the Philosophy of History: "The inferiority of [the Native Americans] in all respects, even in regard to size, is very manifest...[they are] still abiding in their natural condition of rudeness and barbarism" (Hegel 81). Another example: "The Negro, as already observed, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state" (Hegel 93). Of course, we must understand that Hegel was interpreting "barbaric" peoples as the antithesis of Europeans; their negative existence was necessary in order to create a clash of cultures which would result in a new nation which had a fuller understanding of the "plan of Providence." All the same, it is easy to see why many people have criticized Hegel for his outright ethnocentrism and racism.

Nationalism
This fondness of Germany leads us to a second problem in Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel's thought was highly influential in Germany for a great part of the 19th century, and many of his followers used his ideas to support their own nationalistic ideals (we must remember that this was the era when "Germany" did not yet refer to a single state, or in reality, even a single nation). Though Hegel's philosophy is essentially a philosophy of change, many conservatives were able to interpret his thought in a manner consistent with their own right-of-center ideas.

Of course, it hardly takes a great stretch of the imagination to move from Hegel's philosophy to nationalism, for Hegel's belief that individuals are only truly free when they fully identify with their nation certainly eases the transition. "It is a superficial and absurd idea that such a beautiful and truly free life can be produced by a process so incomplex as the developing of a race keeping within the limits of blood relationship and friendship" (Hegel 226). In order to become truly free, the individual must identify with a larger entity than the family or the community; only a complete relationship with the nation can produce true freedom for the individual.

Hegel's belief that the German nation could be identified as the most free nation in human history also helped to fan German nationalist fires. Hegel's insistence that early 19th century Germany had come closer to true freedom than any other nation is rather difficult to believe, for the Prussian monarchy of the period was one of the most autocratic states that history has ever seen. Even so, attendance at Hegel's lectures was never lacking, and more than a few of his students must have been impressed with a certain sense of German nationalism.

Monarchy
Another troubling aspect of Hegel's philosophy of history is his acceptance of the Prussian monarchy. Hegel claims that the Prussian state is the most effective vehicle for carrying out the people's wishes, thereby allowing them to be most free: "In the perfect form of the state, in which all the momenta of the idea have their free existence, this subjectivity is not a so-called moral person, or a resolution of the majority,--forms in which the unity of the resolving will has no real existence,--but a real individuality, the will of one resolving individual,--monarchy" (Stallo 515). Hegel might be forgiven for his extreme devotion to the Prussian state when one considers that it was 19th Prussia he was writing in, and the mood of the people and of the state at the time probably would have been hostile towards any philosophy that pretended to reject monarchy; however, one still finds it odd that Hegel's interpretation of history as a process towards freedom could concomitantly produce the concept that monarchy meant freedom for the German people.

Relativism
Modern philosophers and students of Hegel continue to debate whether he was a historical relativist. Hegel's emphasis on change and process might seem to point to such a conclusion. If cultures, morals, religions, etc., are always becoming, then is there in fact any Universal? Is there any Truth? Of course, Hegel would claim that there is indeed a single Truth and that History is the unfolding of this truth; however, the assertion that Hegel was a relativist can easily be defended, for most of his writings stress that all things, ideas, and people must change through time. If we assume that time is infinite, then all things must change infinitely, and thus, nothing is constant; nothing is True.

The Absolute End
This leads us to the final problem of Hegel's philosophy of history: his telos. Hegel assures his readers that history is progressing towards a true completion, a complete unfolding of the Universal (what Hegel calls the "absolute end of history" (Hegel 103)). While this absolutist strain may be difficult to accept for modern and post-modern individuals, Hegel's own philosophy points to a deep reserve about whether this end is in fact achievable. If all forces are involved in the dialectic process, why should there ever be an end to the clashing of forces (assuming that the number of forces is infinite)? Daniel Berthold-Bond, in his examination of this question, decides that Hegel should have fallen just short of a claim for the complete realization of God; in fact, the dialectic will always continue, but at some point in time, we will be so incredibly close to understanding the full course of history that, for all intensive purposes, we have achieved complete freedom (Berthold-Bond 117). This pill is certainly more easily swallowed than Hegel's absolute idealism, yet one has to wonder if this interpretation is satisfactory. If we assume that History is not the story of the unfolding of God's mind, then must we abandon all of Hegel's other achievements in the philosophy of history? I would say that Hegel's insistence on teleology is not an essential part of his philosophy. Like Berthold-Bond, I would argue that the ability to comprehend processes and the expansive scope of human history is important for the individual to come to a fuller sense of self, yet I do not necessarily believe that a study of history will lead to a complete sense of self and God. However, my beliefs are the subject of another paper; my tendency to be a bit prolix keeps me from elaborating further on this subject.

Hegel's philosophy of history has greatly influenced our modern historical methods and studies. No longer are we content to examine merely the political history of a nation. No longer are we content (at least, not always) to treat history as a dead subject with no relevance to contemporary issues. No longer do we assume that historians are objective; in fact, we have massive controversies over which historians are so subjective that they are clouding the "truth" of history (e.g., the current debate over the National Historical Standards). Students of Hegel have proven themselves to be some of the most influential historians of all time; for example, Marx's materialistic interpretation of history and David Strauss' attempt to discover the "true" life of Jesus are some of the finest examples of the original "new history" that the modern world has produced since Hegel. Of course, Hegel's philosophy of history has many problems, among them racism, nationalism, support of monarchy, a tendency towards relativism, and a difficult-to-accept absolutist strain. However, Hegel probably would have been the first to admit that his interpretation of history was wrong; only those who came after him and took his ideas to a new level (that dialectic keeps on kickin') would be able to achieve a fuller comprehension of the true meaning of history. Although we have traveled more than a century beyond Hegel's time, it seems to me that his philosophy of history is still a crucial means for any historian to understand the underlying reason for his or her work; without a solid understanding of the purpose of history, no historian can make his or her work relevant or justifiable.

Another overview of Hegel's philosophy of history that I believe is well-researched and well written is: Approaches to History, edited by Pardon E. Tillinghast, published by Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, in 1963. See pages 182-220 for an overview of Hegel's philosophy of history as well as some selected readings that nicely illustrate Hegel's approach to history.

Works Cited
Berthold-Bond, Daniel. Hegel's Grand Synthesis: A Study of Being, Thought, and History. New York: State U. of NY Press, 1989.
Gillespie, Michael A. Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History. Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1984.
Hegel, Georg W. F., trans. by J. Sibree. Philosophy of History. New York: The Colonial Press, 1899.
Stallo, Johann B. The Principles of the Philosophy of Nature. Boston: Crosby and Nichols, 1848.

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